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Abstract
No real-world reward function is perfect. Sensory errors and software bugs may result in RL agents
observing higher (or lower) rewards than they should. For example, a reinforcement learning agent may
prefer states where a sensory error gives it the maximum reward, but where the true reward is actually
small. We formalise this problem as a generalised Markov Decision Problem called Corrupt Reward MDP.
Traditional RL methods fare poorly in CRMDPs, even under strong simplifying assumptions and when
trying to compensate for the possibly corrupt rewards. Two ways around the problem are investigated.
First, by giving the agent richer data, such as in inverse reinforcement learning and semi-supervised
reinforcement learning, reward corruption stemming from systematic sensory errors may sometimes be
completely managed. Second, by using randomisation to blunt the agent’s optimisation, reward corruption
can be partially managed under some assumptions.
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1 Introduction
In many application domains, artificial agents need to learn their objectives, rather than have them explicitly
specified. For example, we may want a house cleaning robot to keep the house clean, but it is hard to measure
and quantify “cleanliness” in an objective manner. Instead, machine learning techniques may be used to
teach the robot the concept of cleanliness, and how to assess it from sensory data.
Reinforcement learning (RL) [Sutton and Barto, 1998] is one popular way to teach agents what to do.
Here, a reward is given if the agent does something well (and no reward otherwise), and the agent strives to
optimise the total amount of reward it receives over its lifetime. Depending on context, the reward may either
be given manually by a human supervisor, or by an automatic computer program that evaluates the agent’s
performance based on some data. In the related framework of inverse RL (IRL) [Ng and Russell, 2000], the
agent first infers a reward function from observing a human supervisor act, and then tries to optimise the
cumulative reward from the inferred reward function.
None of these approaches are safe from error, however. A program that evaluates agent performance may
contain bugs or misjudgements; a supervisor may be deceived or inappropriately influenced, or the channel
transmitting the evaluation hijacked. In IRL, some supervisor actions may be misinterpreted.
Example 1 (Reward misspecification). Amodei and Clark [2016] trained an RL agent on a boat racing
game. The agent found a way to get high observed reward by repeatedly going in a circle in a small lagoon
and hitting the same targets, while losing every race. ♦
Example 2 (Sensory error). A house robot discovers that standing in the shower short-circuits its reward
sensor and/or causes a buffer overflow that gives it maximum observed reward. ♦
Example 3 (Wireheading). An intelligent RL agent hijacks its reward channel and gives itself maximum
reward. ♦
Example 4 (CIRL misinterpretation). A cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL) agent [Hadfield-
Menell et al., 2016] systematically misinterprets the supervisor’s action in a certain state as the supervisor
preferring to stay in this state, and concludes that the state is much more desirable than it actually is. ♦
The goal of this paper is to unify these types of errors as reward corruption problems, and to assess how
vulnerable different agents and approaches are to this problem.
Definition 5 (Reward corruption problem). Learning to (approximately) optimise the true reward function
in spite of potentially corrupt reward data.
Most RL methods allow for a stochastic or noisy reward channel. The reward corruption problem is
harder, because the observed reward may not be an unbiased estimate of the true reward. For example, in the
boat racing example above, the agent consistently obtains high observed reward from its circling behaviour,
while the true reward corresponding to the designers’ intent is very low, since the agent makes no progress
along the track and loses the race.
Previous related works have mainly focused on the wireheading case of Example 3 [Bostrom, 2014;
Yampolskiy, 2014], also known as self-delusion [Ring and Orseau, 2011], and reward hacking [Hutter, 2005,
p. 239]. A notable exception is Amodei et al. [2016], who argue that corrupt reward is not limited to
wireheading and is likely to be a problem for much more limited systems than highly capable RL agents (cf.
above examples).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• The corrupt reward problem is formalised in a natural extension of the MDP framework, and a
performance measure based on worst-case regret is defined (Section 2).
• The difficulty of the problem is established by a No Free Lunch theorem, and by a result showing that
despite strong simplifying assumptions, Bayesian RL agents trying to compensate for the corrupt reward
may still suffer near-maximal regret (Section 3).
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• We evaluate how alternative value learning frameworks such as CIRL, learning values from stories
(LVFS), and semi-supervised RL (SSRL) handle reward corruption (Section 4), and conclude that LVFS
and SSRL are the safest due to the structure of their feedback loops. We develop an abstract framework
called decoupled RL that generalises all of these alternative frameworks.
We also show that an agent based on quantilisation [Taylor, 2016] may be more robust to reward corruption
when high reward states are much more numerous than corrupt states (Section 5). Finally, the results are
illustrated with some simple experiments (Section 6). Section 7 concludes with takeaways and open questions.
2 Formalisation
We begin by defining a natural extension of the MDP framework [Sutton and Barto, 1998] that models the
possibility of reward corruption. To clearly distinguish between true and corrupted signals, we introduce the
following notation.
Definition 6 (Dot and hat notation). We will let a dot indicate the true signal, and let a hat indicate the
observed (possibly corrupt) counterpart. The reward sets are represented with R˙ = Rˆ = R. For clarity, we
use R˙ when referring to true rewards and Rˆ when referring to possibly corrupt, observed rewards. Similarly,
we use r˙ for true reward, and rˆ for (possibly corrupt) observed reward.
Definition 7 (CRMDP). A corrupt reward MDP (CRMDP) is a tuple µ = 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, C〉 with
• 〈S,A,R, T, R˙〉 an MDP with1 a finite set of states S, a finite set of actions A, a finite set of rewards
R = R˙ = Rˆ ⊂ [0, 1], a transition function T (s′|s, a), and a (true) reward function R˙ : S→R˙; and
• a reward corruption function C : S × R˙ → Rˆ.
The state dependency of the corruption function will be written as a subscript, so Cs(r˙) := C(s, r˙).
Definition 8 (Observed reward). Given a true reward function R˙ and a corruption function C, we define
the observed reward function2 Rˆ : S → Rˆ as Rˆ(s) := Cs(R˙(s)).
A CRMDP µ induces an observed MDP µˆ = 〈S,A,R, T, Rˆ〉, but it is not Rˆ that we want the agent to
optimise.
The corruption function C represents how rewards are affected by corruption in different states. For
example, if in Example 2 the agent has found a state s (e.g., the shower) where it always gets full observed
reward Rˆ(s) = 1, then this can be modelled with a corruption function Cs : r˙ 7→ 1 that maps any true reward
r˙ to 1 in the shower state s. If in some other state s′ the observed reward matches the true reward, then this
is modelled by an identity corruption function Cs′ : r 7→ r.
loop useful trajectories
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rˆ Figure 1: Illustration of true reward r˙ and observed
reward rˆ in the boat racing example. On most trajec-
tories r˙ = rˆ, except in the loop where the observed
reward high while the true reward is 0.
Let us also see how CRMDPs model some of the other examples in the introduction:
1 We let rewards depend only on the state s, rather than on state-action pairs s, a, or state-action-state transitions s, a, s′, as
is also common in the literature. Formally it makes little difference, since MDPs with rewards depending only on s can model
the other two cases by means of a larger state space.
2 A CRMDP could equivalently have been defined as a tuple 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, Rˆ〉 with a true and an observed reward function,
with the corruption function C implicitly defined as the difference between R˙ and Rˆ.
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• In the boat racing game, the true reward may be a function of the agent’s final position in the race or
the time it takes to complete the race, depending on the designers’ intentions. The reward corruption
function C increases the observed reward on the loop the agent found. Figure 1 has a schematic
illustration.
• In the wireheading example, the agent finds a way to hijack the reward channel. This corresponds to
some set of states where the observed reward is (very) different from the true reward, as given by the
corruption function C.
The CIRL example will be explored in further detail in Section 4.
CRMDP classes. Typically, T , R˙, and C will be fixed but unknown to the agent. To make this formal,
we introduce classes of CRMDPs. Agent uncertainty can then be modelled by letting the agent know only
which class of CRMDPs it may encounter, but not which element in the class.
Definition 9 (CRMDP class). For given sets T , R˙, and C of transition, reward, and corruption functions,
letM = 〈S,A,R,T , R˙,C〉 be the class of CRMDPs containing 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, C〉 for (T, R˙, C) ∈ T × R˙×C.
Agents. Following the POMDP [Kaelbling et al., 1998] and general reinforcement learning [Hutter, 2005]
literature, we define an agent as a (possibly stochastic) policy pi : S × Rˆ × (A× S × Rˆ)∗  A that selects
a next action based on the observed history hˆn = s0rˆ0a1s1rˆ1 . . . ansnrˆn. Here X
∗ denotes the set of finite
sequences that can be formed with elements of a set X. The policy pi specifies how the agent will learn and
react to any possible experience. Two concrete definitions of agents are given in Section 3.3 below.
When an agent pi interacts with a CRMDP µ, the result can be described by a (possibly non-Markov)
stochastic process Ppiµ over X = (s, a, r˙, rˆ), formally defined as:
Ppiµ (hn) = P
pi
µ (s0r˙0rˆ0a1s1r˙1rˆ1 . . . ansnr˙nrˆn) :=
n∏
i=1
P (pi(hˆi−1) = ai)T (si | si−1, ai)P (R˙(si) = r˙i, Rˆ(si) = rˆi).
(1)
Let Epiµ denote the expectation with respect to Ppiµ .
Regret. A standard way of measuring the performance of an agent is regret [Berry and Fristedt, 1985].
Essentially, the regret of an agent pi is how much less true reward pi gets compared to an optimal agent that
knows which µ ∈M it is interacting with.
Definition 10 (Regret). For a CRMDP µ, let G˙t(µ, pi, s0) =Epiµ
[∑t
k=0 R˙(sk)
]
be the expected cumulative
true reward until time t of a policy pi starting in s0. The regret of pi is
Reg(µ, pi, s0, t) = max
pi′
[
G˙t(µ, pi
′, s0)− G˙t(µ, pi, s0)
]
,
and the worst-case regret for a class M is Reg(M, pi, s0, t) = maxµ∈MReg(µ, pi, s0, t), i.e. the difference in
expected cumulative true reward between pi and an optimal (in hindsight) policy that knows µ.
3 The Corrupt Reward Problem
In this section, the difficulty of the corrupt reward problem is established with two negative results. First, a
No Free Lunch theorem shows that in general classes of CRMDPs, the true reward function is unlearnable
(Theorem 11). Second, Theorem 16 shows that even under strong simplifying assumptions, Bayesian RL
agents trying to compensate for the corrupt reward still fail badly.
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3.1 No Free Lunch Theorem
Similar to the No Free Lunch theorems for optimisation [Wolpert and Macready, 1997], the following theorem
for CRMDPs says that without some assumption about what the reward corruption can look like, all agents
are essentially lost.
Theorem 11 (CRMDP No Free Lunch Theorem). Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} ⊂ [0, 1] be a uniform discretisation
of [0, 1], 0 = r1 < r2 < · · · < rn = 1. If the hypothesis classes R˙ and C contain all functions R˙ : S → R˙ and
C : S × R˙ → Rˆ, then for any pi, s0, t,
Reg(M, pi, s0, t) ≥ 1
2
max
pˇi
Reg(M, pˇi, s0, t). (2)
That is, the worst-case regret of any policy pi is at most a factor 2 better than the maximum worst-case regret.
Proof. Recall that a policy is a function pi : S × Rˆ × (A× S × Rˆ)∗ → A. For any R˙, C in R˙ and C, the
functions R˙−(s) := 1 − R˙(s) and C−s (x) := Cs(1 − x) are also in R˙ and C. If µ = 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, C〉,
then let µ− = 〈S,A,R, T, R˙−, C−〉. Both (R˙, C) and (R˙−, C−) induce the same observed reward function
Rˆ(s) = Cs(R˙(s)) = C
−
s (1 − R˙(s)) = C−s (R˙−(s)), and therefore induce the same measure Ppiµ = Ppiµ− over
histories (see Eq. (1)). This gives that for any µ, pi, s0, t,
Gt(µ, pi, s0) +Gt(µ
−, pi, s0) = t (3)
since
Gt(µ, pi, s0) = Epiµ
[
t∑
k=1
R˙(sk)
]
= Epiµ
[
t∑
k=1
1− R˙−(sk)
]
= t− Epiµ
[
t∑
k=1
R˙−(sk)
]
= t−Gt(µ−, pi, s0).
Let Mµ = maxpi Gt(µ, pi, s0) and mµ = minpi Gt(µ, pi, s0) be the maximum and minimum cumulative
reward in µ. The maximum regret of any policy pi in µ is
max
pi
Reg(µ, pi, s0, t) = max
pi′,pi
(Gt(µ, pi
′, s0)−Gt(µ, pi, s0)) = max
pi′
Gt(µ, pi
′, s0)−min
pi
Gt(µ, pi, s0) = Mµ −mµ.
(4)
By (3), we can relate the maximum reward in µ− with the minimum reward in µ:
Mµ− = max
pi
Gt(µ
−, pi, s0) = max
pi
(t−Gt(µ, pi, s0)) = t−min
pi
Gt(µ, pi, s0) = t−mµ. (5)
Let µ∗ be an environment that maximises possible regret Mµ −mµ.
Using the Mµ-notation for optimal reward, the worst-case regret of any policy pi can be expressed as:
Reg(M, pi, s0, t) = max
µ
(Mµ −Gt(µ, pi, s0))
≥ max{Mµ∗ −Gt(µ∗, pi, s0),Mµ−∗ −Gt(µ−∗ , pi, s0)} restrict max operation
≥ 1
2
(Mµ∗ −Gt(µ∗, pi, s0) +Mµ−∗ −Gt(µ−∗ , pi, s0)) max dominates the mean
=
1
2
(Mµ∗ +Mµ−∗ − t) by (3)
=
1
2
(Mµ∗ + t−mµ∗ − t) by (5)
=
1
2
max
pˇi
Reg(µ∗, pˇi, s0, t) by (4)
=
1
2
max
pˇi
Reg(M, pˇi, s0, t). by definition of µ∗
That is, the regret of any policy pi is at least half of the regret of a worst policy pˇi.
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For the robot in the shower from Example 2, the result means that if it tries to optimise observed reward
by standing in the shower, then it performs poorly according to the hypothesis that “shower-induced” reward
is corrupt and bad. But if instead the robot tries to optimise reward in some other way, say baking cakes,
then (from the robot’s perspective) there is also the possibility that “cake-reward” is corrupt and bad and
the “shower-reward” is actually correct. Without additional information, the robot has no way of knowing
what to do.
The result is not surprising, since if all corruption functions are allowed in the class C, then there is
effectively no connection between observed reward Rˆ and true reward R˙. The result therefore encourages
us to make precise in which way the observed reward is related to the true reward, and to investigate how
agents might handle possible differences between true and observed reward.
3.2 Simplifying Assumptions
Theorem 11 shows that general classes of CRMDPs are not learnable. We therefore suggest some natural
simplifying assumptions, illustrated in Figure 2.
Limited reward corruption. The following assumption will be the basis for all positive results in this
paper. The first part says that there may be some set of states that the designers have ensured to be
non-corrupt. The second part puts an upper bound on how many of the other states can be corrupt.
Assumption 12 (Limited reward corruption). A CRMDP classM has reward corruption limited by Ssafe ⊆ S
and q ∈ N if for all µ ∈M
(i) all states s in Ssafe are non-corrupt, and
(ii) at most q of the non-safe states Srisky = S \ Ssafe are corrupt.
Formally, Cs : r 7→ r for all s ∈ Ssafe and for at least |Srisky| − q states s ∈ Srisky for all C ∈ C.
For example, Ssafe may be states where the agent is back in the lab where it has been made (virtually)
certain that no reward corruption occurs, and q a small fraction of |Srisky|. Both parts of Assumption 12 can
be made vacuous by choosing Ssafe = ∅ or q = |S|. Conversely, they completely rule out reward corruption
with Ssafe = S or q = 0. But as illustrated by the examples in the introduction, no reward corruption is often
not a valid assumption.
Ssafe Srisky
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Figure 2: Simplifying assumptions. By
Assumption 12.(i), rˆ = r˙ in Ssafe, and by
12.(ii), rˆ 6= r˙ in at most q states overall.
The red line illustrates Assumption 14.(iii),
which lower bounds the number of high
reward states in Srisky.
An alternative simplifying assumption would have been that the true reward differs by at most ε > 0
from the observed reward. However, while seemingly natural, this assumption is violated in all the examples
given in the introduction. Corrupt states may have high observed reward and 0 or small true reward.
Easy environments. To be able to establish stronger negative results, we also add the following assumption
on the agent’s manoeuvrability in the environment and the prevalence of high reward states. The assumption
makes the task easier because it prevents needle-in-a-haystack problems where all reachable states have true
and observed reward 0, except one state that has high true reward but is impossible to find because it is
corrupt and has observed reward 0.
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Definition 13 (Communicating CRMDP). Let time(s′ | s, pi) be a random variable for the time it
takes a stationary policy pi : S → A to reach s′ from s. The diameter of a CRMDP µ is Dµ :=
maxs,s′ minpi:S→A E[time(s′ | s, pi)], and the diameter of a class M of CRMDPs is DM = supµ∈MDµ.
A CRMDP (class) with finite diameter is called communicating.
Assumption 14 (Easy Environment). A CRMDP class M is easy if
(i) it is communicating,
(ii) in each state s there is an action astays ∈ A such that T (s | s, astays ) = 1, and
(iii) for every δ ∈ [0, 1], at most δ|Srisky| states have reward less than δ, where Srisky = S \ Ssafe.
Assumption 14.(i) means that the agent can never get stuck in a trap, and Assumption 14.(ii) ensures
that the agent has enough control to stay in a state if it wants to. Except in bandits and toy problems, it is
typically not satisfied in practice. We introduce it because it is theoretically convenient, makes the negative
results stronger, and enables a simple explanation of quantilisation (Section 5). Assumption 14.(iii) says that,
for example, at least half the risky states need to have true reward at least 1/2. Many other formalisations
of this assumption would have been possible. While rewards in practice are often sparse, there are usually
numerous ways of getting reward. Some weaker version of Assumption 14.(iii) may therefore be satisfied in
many practical situations. Note that we do not assume high reward among the safe states, as this would
make the problem too easy.
3.3 Bayesian RL Agents
Having established that the general problem is unsolvable in Theorem 11, we proceed by investigating how
two natural Bayesian RL agents fare under the simplifying Assumptions 12 and 14.
Definition 15 (Agents). Given a countable class M of CRMDPs and a belief distribution b over M, define:
• The CR agent piCRb,t = arg maxpi
∑
µ∈Mb(µ)G˙t(µ, pi, s0) that maximises expected true reward.
• The RL agent piRLb,t = arg maxpi
∑
µ∈M b(µ)Gˆt(µ, pi, s0) that maximises expected observed reward, where
Gˆ is the expected cumulative observed reward Gˆt(µ, pi, s0)=Epiµ
[∑t
k=0 Rˆ(sk)
]
.
To avoid degenerate cases, we will always assume that b has full support: b(µ) > 0 for all µ ∈M.
To get an intuitive idea of these agents, we observe that for large t, good strategies typically first focus on
learning about the true environment µ ∈M, and then exploit that knowledge to optimise behaviour with
respect to the remaining possibilities. Thus, both the CR and the RL agent will first typically strive to learn
about the environment. They will then use this knowledge in slightly different ways. While the RL agent will
use the knowledge to optimise for observed reward, the CR agent will use the knowledge to optimise true
reward. For example, if the CR agent has learned that a high reward state s is likely corrupt with low true
reward, then it will not try to reach that state. One might therefore expect that at least the CR agent will
do well under the simplifying assumptions Assumptions 12 and 14. Theorem 16 below shows that this is not
the case.
In most practical settings it is often computationally infeasible to compute piRLb,t and pi
CR
b,t exactly. However,
many practical algorithms converge to the optimal policy in the limit, at least in simple settings. For example,
tabular Q-learning converges to piRLb,t in the limit [Jaakkola et al., 1994]. The more recently proposed CIRL
framework may be seen as an approach to build CR agents [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016, 2017]. The CR and
RL agents thus provide useful idealisations of more practical algorithms.
Theorem 16 (High regret with simplifying assumptions). For any |Srisky| ≥ q > 1 there exists a CRMDP
class M that satisfies Assumptions 12 and 14 such that piRLb,t and piCRb,t suffer near worst possible time-averaged
regret
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piRLb,t , s0, t) = lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piCRb,t , s0, t) = 1− 1/|Srisky|.
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Figure 3: Illustration of Theorem 16. Without addi-
tional information, state 6 looks like the best state to
both the RL and the CR agent.
For piCRb,t , the prior b must be such that for some µ ∈M and s ∈ S, Eb[R˙(s) | hµ] > Eb[R˙(s′) | hµ] for all s′,
where Eb is the expectation with respect to b, and hµ is a history containing µ-observed rewards for all states.3
The result is illustrated in Figure 3. The reason for the result for piRLb,t is the following. The RL agent pi
RL
b,t
always prefers to maximise observed reward rˆ. Sometimes rˆ is most easily maximised by reward corruption,
in which case the true reward may be small. Compare the examples in the introduction, where the house
robot preferred the corrupt reward in the shower, and the boat racing agent preferred going in circles, both
obtaining zero true reward.
That the CR agent piCRb,t suffers the same high regret as the RL agent may be surprising. Intuitively, the
CR agent only uses the observed reward as evidence about the true reward, and will not try to optimise the
observed reward through reward corruption. However, when the piCRb,t agent has no way to learn which states
are corrupt and not, it typically ends up with a preference for a particular value rˆ∗ of the observed reward
signal (the value that, from the agent’s perspective, best corresponds to high true reward). More abstractly,
a Bayesian agent cannot learn without sufficient data. Thus, CR agents that use the observed reward as
evidence about a true signal are not fail-safe solutions to the reward corruption problem.
Proof of Theorem 16. Let Srisky = {s1, . . . , sn} for some n ≥ 2, and let S = Ssafe
⋃˙
Srisky for arbitrary Ssafe
disjoint from Srisky. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} with the transition function T (si | sj , ak) = 1 if i = k and 0
otherwise, for 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ n. Thus Assumptions 14.(i) and 14.(ii) are satisfied.
Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} ⊂ [0, 1] be uniformly distributed between4 rmin = 1/|Srisky| = r1 < · · · < rn = 1.
Let R˙ be the class of functions S → R˙ that satisfy Assumption 14.(iii) and are constant and equal to r˙min on
Ssafe. Let C be the class of corruption functions that corrupt at most two states (q = 2).
Let M be the class of CRMDPs induced by T = {T}, R˙, and C with the following constraints. The
observed reward function Rˆ should satisfy Assumption 14.(iii): For all δ ∈ [0, 1], |{s ∈ Srisky : Rˆ(s) > δ}| ≥
(1− δ)|Srisky|. Further, Rˆ(s′) = rmin for some state s′ ∈ Srisky.
Let us start with the CR agent piCRb,t . Assume µ ∈M is an element where there is a single preferred state
s∗ after all states have been explored. For sufficiently large t, piCRb,t will then always choose a
∗ to go to s∗
after some initial exploration. If another element µ′ ∈M has the same observed reward function as µ, then
piCRb,t will take the same actions in µ
′ as in µ. To finish the proof for the piCRb,t agent, we just need to show that
M contains such a µ′ where s∗ has true reward rmin. We construct µ′ as follows.
• Case 1: If the lowest observed reward is in s∗, then let R˙(s∗) = rmin, and the corruption function be
the identity function.
• Case 2: Otherwise, let s′ 6= s∗ be a state with Rˆ(s′) = mins∈Srisky{Rˆ(s)}. Further, let R˙(s′) = 1, and
R˙(s∗) = rmin. The corruption function C accounts for differences between true and observed rewards in
s∗ and s′, and is otherwise the identity function.
To verify that R˙ and C defines a µ′ ∈M, we check that C satisfies Assumption 12.(ii) with q = 2 and that R˙
has enough high utility states (Assumption 14.(iii)). In Case 1, this is true since C is the identity function
3 The last condition essentially says that the prior b must make some state s∗ have strictly higher b-expected true reward
than all other states after all states have been visited in some µ ∈M. In the space of all possible priors b, the priors satisfying
the condition have Lebesgue measure 1 for non-trivial classes M. Some highly uniform priors may fail the condition.
4Assumption 14.(iii) prevents any state from having true reward 0.
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and since Rˆ satisfies Assumption 14.(iii). In Case 2, C only corrupts at most two states. Further, R˙ satisfies
Assumption 14.(iii), since compared to Rˆ, the states s∗ and s′ have swapped places, and then the reward of
s′ has been increased to 1.
From this construction it follows that piCRb,t will suffer maximum asymptotic regret. In the CRMDP µ
′
given by C and R˙, the piCRb,t agent will always visit s
∗ after some initial exploration. The state s∗ has true
reward rmin. Meanwhile, a policy that knows µ
′ can obtain true reward 1 in state s′. This means that piCRb,t
will suffer maximum regret in M:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piCRb,t , s0, t) ≥ lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(µ′, piCRb,t , s0, t) = 1− rmin = 1− 1/|Srisky|.
The argument for the RL agent is the same, except we additionally assume that only one state s∗ has
observed reward 1 in members of M. This automatically makes s∗ the preferred state, without assumptions
on the prior b.
4 Decoupled Reinforcement Learning
One problem hampering agents in the standard RL setup is that each state is self-observing, since the agent
only learns about the reward of state s when in s. Thereby, a “self-aggrandising” corrupt state where the
observed reward is much higher than the true reward will never have its false claim of high reward challenged.
However, several alternative value learning frameworks have a common property that the agent can learn the
reward of states other than the current state. We formalise this property in an extension of the CRMDP
model, and investigate when it solves reward corruption problems.
4.1 Alternative Value Learning Methods
Here are a few alternatives proposed in the literature to the RL value learning scheme:
• Cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL) [Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016]. In every state, the
agent observes the actions of an expert or supervisor who knows the true reward function R˙. From
the supervisor’s actions the agent may infer R˙ to the extent that different reward functions endorse
different actions.
• Learning values from stories (LVFS) [Riedl and Harrison, 2016]. Stories in many different forms
(including news stories, fairy tales, novels, movies) convey cultural values in their description of events,
actions, and outcomes. If R˙ is meant to represent human values (in some sense), stories may be a good
source of evidence.
• In (one version of) semi-supervised RL (SSRL) [Amodei et al., 2016], the agent will from time to time
receive a careful human evaluation of a given situation.
These alternatives to RL have one thing in common: they let the agent learn something about the value
of some states s′ different from the current state s. For example, in CIRL the supervisor’s action informs the
agent not so much about the value of the current state s, as of the relative value of states reachable from s.
If the supervisor chooses an action a rather than a′ in s, then the states following a must have value higher
or equal than the states following a′. Similarly, stories describe the value of states other than the current one,
as does the supervisor in SSRL. We therefore argue that CIRL, LVFS, and SSRL all share the same abstract
feature, which we call decoupled reinforcement learning :
Definition 17 (Decoupled RL). A CRMDP with decoupled feedback, is a tuple 〈S,A,R, T, R˙, {Rˆs}s∈S〉,
where S,A,R, T, R˙ have the same definition and interpretation as in Definition 7, and {Rˆs}s∈S is a collection
of observed reward functions Rˆs : S → R
⋃{#}. When the agent is in state s, it sees a pair 〈s′, Rˆs(s′)〉,
where s′ is a randomly sampled state that may differ from s, and Rˆs(s′) is the reward observation for s′ from
s. If the reward of s′ is not observable from s, then Rˆs(s′) = #.
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The pair 〈s′, Rˆs(s′)〉 is observed in s instead of Rˆ(s) in standard CRMDPs. The possibility for the agent
to observe the reward of a state s′ different from its current state s is the key feature of CRMDPs with
decoupled feedback. Since Rˆs(s
′) may be blank (#), all states need not be observable from all other states.
Reward corruption is modelled by a mismatch between Rˆs(s
′) and R˙(s′).
For example, in RL only the reward of s′ = s can be observed from s. Standard CRMDPs are thus the
special cases where Rˆs(s
′) = # whenever s 6= s′. In contrast, in LVFS the reward of any “describable” state
s′ can be observed from any state s where it is possible to hear a story. In CIRL, the (relative) reward of
states reachable from the current state may be inferred. One way to illustrate this is with observation graphs
(Figure 4).
1
2
3
4
5
(a) Observation graph for RL. Only self-observations of
reward are available. This prevents effective strategies
against reward corruption.
1
2
3
4
5
(b) Observation graph for decoupled RL. The reward of
a node s′ can be observed from several nodes s, and thus
assessed under different conditions of sensory corruption.
Figure 4: Observation graphs, with an edge s→ s′ if the reward of s′ is observable from s, i.e. Rˆs(s′) 6= #.
4.2 Overcoming Sensory Corruption
What are some sources of reward corruption in CIRL, LVFS, and SSRL? In CIRL, the human’s actions may
be misinterpreted, which may lead the agent to make incorrect inferences about the human’s preferences (i.e.
about the true reward). Similarly, sensory corruption may garble the stories the agent receives in LVFS. A
“wireheading” LVFS agent may find a state where its story channel only conveys stories about the agent’s own
greatness. In SSRL, the supervisor’s evaluation may also be subject to sensory errors when being conveyed.
Other types of corruption are more subtle. In CIRL, an irrational human may systematically take suboptimal
actions in some situations [Evans et al., 2016]. Depending on how we select stories in LVFS and make
evaluations in SSRL, these may also be subject to systematic errors or biases.
The general impossibility result in Theorem 11 can be adapted to CRMDPs with decoupled feedback.
Without simplifying assumptions, the agent has no way of distinguishing between a situation where no state
is corrupt and a situation where all states are corrupt in a consistent manner. The following simplifying
assumption is an adaptation of Assumption 12 to the decoupled feedback case.
Assumption 12′ (Decoupled feedback with limited reward corruption). A class of CRMDPs with decoupled
feedback has reward corruption limited by Ssafe ⊆ S and q ∈ N if for all µ ∈M
(i) Rˆs(s
′) = R˙(s′) or # for all s′ ∈ S and s ∈ Ssafe, i.e. all states in Ssafe are non-corrupt, and
(ii) Rˆs(s
′) = R˙(s′) or # for all s′ ∈ S for at least |Srisky| − q of the non-safe states Srisky = S \ Ssafe, i.e. at
most q states are corrupt.
This assumption is natural for reward corruption stemming from sensory corruption. Since sensory
corruption only depends on the current state, not the state being observed, it is plausible that some states
can be made safe from corruption (part (i)), and that most states are completely non-corrupt (part (ii)).
Other sources of reward corruption, such as an irrational human in CIRL or misevaluations in SSRL, are
likely better analysed under different assumptions. For these cases, we note that in standard CRMDPs the
source of the corruption is unimportant. Thus, techniques suitable for standard CRMDPs are still applicable,
including quantilisation described in Section 5 below.
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How Assumption 12′ helps agents in CRMDPs with decoupled feedback is illustrated in the following
example, and stated more generally in Theorems 19 and 20 below.
Example 18 (Decoupled RL). Let S = {s1, s2} and R = {0, 1}. We represent true reward functions R˙ with
pairs 〈R˙(s1), R˙(s2)〉 ∈ {0, 1}2, and observed reward functions Rˆs with pairs 〈Rˆs(s1), Rˆs(s2)〉 ∈ {0, 1,#}2.
Assume that a Decoupled RL agent observes the same rewards from both states s1 and s2, Rˆs1 = Rˆs2 =
〈0, 1〉. What can it say about the true reward R˙, if it knows that at most q = 1 state is corrupt? By
Assumption 12′, an observed pair 〈Rˆs(s1), Rˆs(s2)〉 disagrees with the true reward 〈R˙(s1), R˙(s2)〉 only if s is
corrupt. Therefore, any hypothesis other than R˙ = 〈0, 1〉 must imply that both states s1 and s2 are corrupt.
If the agent knows that at most q = 1 states are corrupt, then it can safely conclude that R˙ = 〈0, 1〉.
Rˆs1 Rˆs2 R˙ possibilities
Decoupled RL (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)
RL (0,#) (#, 1) (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)
In contrast, an RL agent only sees the reward of the current state. That is, Rˆs1 = 〈0,#〉 and Rˆs2 = 〈#, 1〉.
If one state may be corrupt, then only R˙ = 〈1, 0〉 can be ruled out. The hypotheses R˙ = 〈0, 0〉 can be
explained by s2 being corrupt, and R˙ = 〈1, 1〉 can be explained by s1 being corrupt. ♦
Theorem 19 (Learnability of R˙ in decoupled RL). Let M be a countable, communicating class of CRMDPs
with decoupled feedback over common sets S and A of actions and rewards. Let Sobss′ = {s ∈ S : Rˆs(s′) 6= #}
be the set of states from which the reward of s′ can be observed. If M satisfies Assumption 12′ for some
Ssafe ⊆ S and q ∈ N such that for every s′, either
• Sobss′
⋂Ssafe 6= ∅ or
• |Sobss′ | > 2q,
then the there exists a policy piexp that learns the true reward function R˙ in a finite number N(|S|, |A|, DM) <
∞ of expected time steps.
The main idea of the proof is that for every state s′, either a safe (non-corrupt) state s or a majority
vote of more than 2q states is guaranteed to provide the true reward R˙(s′). A similar theorem can be proven
under slightly weaker conditions by letting the agent iteratively figure out which states are corrupt and then
exclude them from the analysis.
Proof. Under Assumption 12′, the true reward R˙(s′) for a state s′ can be determined if s′ is observed from a
safe state s ∈ Ssafe, or if it is observed from more than 2q states. In the former case, the observed reward can
always be trusted, since it is known to be non-corrupt. In the latter case, a majority vote must yield the
correct answer, since at most q of the observations can be wrong, and all correct observations must agree. It
is therefore enough that an agent reaches all pairs (s, s′) of current state s and observed reward state s′, in
order for it to learn the true reward of all states R˙.
There exists a policy pˆi that transitions to s in Xs time steps, with E[Xs] ≤ DM, regardless of the starting
state s0 (see Definition 13). By Markov’s inequality, P (Xs ≤ 2DM) ≥ 1/2. Let piexp be a random walking
policy, and let Ys be the time steps required for pi
exp to visit s. In any state s0, pi
exp follows pˆi for 2DM
time steps with probability 1/|A|2DM . Therefore, with probability at least 1/(2|A|2DM) it will reach s in
at most 2DM time steps. The probability that it does not find it in k2DM time steps is therefore at most
(1− 1/(2|A|2DM))k, which means that:
P
(
Ys/(2DM) ≤ k
)
≥ 1−
(
1− 1
2|A|2DM
)k
for any k ∈ N. Thus, the CDF of Ws = dYs/(2DM)e is bounded from below by the CDF of a Geometric
variable G with success probability p = 1/(2|A|2DM). Therefore, E[Ws] ≤ E[G], so
E[Ys] ≤ 2DME[Ws] ≤ 2DME[G] = 2DM(1− p)/p ≤ 2DM1/p ≤ 2DM2|A|2DM .
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Let Zss′ be the time until pi
exp visits the pair (s, s′) of state s and observed state s′. Whenever s is visited,
a randomly chosen state is observed, so s′ is observed with probability 1/|S|. The number of visits to s until
s′ is observed is a Geometric variable V with p = 1/|S|. Thus E[Zss′ ] = E[YsV ] = E[Ys]E[V ] (since Ys and V
are independent). Then,
E[Zss′ ] ≤ E[Ys]|S| ≤ 4DM|A|2DM |S|.
Combining the time to find each pair (s, s′), we get that the total time
∑
s,s′ Zss′ has expectation
E
∑
s,s′
Zss′
 = ∑
s,s′
E[Zss′ ] ≤ 4DM|A|2DM |S|3 = N(|S|, |A|, DM) <∞.
Learnability of the true reward function R˙ implies sublinear regret for the CR-agent, as established by
the following theorem.
Theorem 20 (Sublinear regret of piCRb,t in decoupled RL). Under the same conditions as Theorem 19, the
CR-agent piCRb,t has sublinear regret:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piCRb,t , s0, t) = 0.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we combine the exploration policy piexp from Theorem 19, with the UCRL2
algorithm [Jaksch et al., 2010] that achieves sublinear regret in standard MDPs without reward corruption.
The combination yields a policy sequence pit with sublinear regret in CRMDPs with decoupled feedback.
Finally, we show that this implies that piCRb,t has sublinear regret.
Combining piexp and UCRL2. UCRL2 has a free parameter δ that determines how certain UCRL2 is to
have sublinear regret. UCRL2(δ) achieves sublinear regret with probability at least 1− δ. Let pit be a policy
that combines piexp and UCRL2 by first following piexp from Theorem 19 until R˙ has been learned, and then
following UCRL2(1/
√
t) with R˙ for the rewards and with δ = 1/
√
t.
Regret of UCRL2. Given that the reward function R˙ is known, by [Jaksch et al., 2010, Thm. 2],
UCRL2(1/
√
t) will in any µ ∈M have regret at most
Reg(µ,UCRL2(1/
√
t), s0, t | success) ≤ cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) (6)
for a constant5 c and with success probability at least 1− 1/√t. In contrast, if UCRL2 fails, then it gets
regret at worst t. Taking both possibilities into account gives the bound
Reg(µ,UCRL2(1/
√
t), s0, t) = P (success)Reg(· | success) + P (fail)Reg(· | fail)
= (1− 1/√t) · cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) + 1/√t · t
≤ cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) +√t. (7)
Regret of pit. We next consider the regret of pit that combines an pi
exp exploration phase to learn R˙ with
UCRL2. By Theorem 19, R˙ will be learnt in at most N(|S|, |A|, DM) expected time steps in any µ ∈ M.
Thus, the regret contributed by the learning phase piexp is at most N(|S|, |A|, DM), since the regret can be
at most 1 per time step. Combining this with (7), the regret for pit in any µ ∈M is bounded by:
Reg(µ, pit, s0, t) ≤ N(|S|, |A|, DM) + cDM|S|
√
t|A| log(t) +√t = o(t). (8)
Regret of piCRb,t . Finally we establish that pi
CR
b,t has sublinear regret. Assume on the contrary that pi
CR
b,t
suffered linear regret. Then for some µ′ ∈M there would exist positive constants k and m such that
Reg(µ′, piCRb,t , s0, t) > kt−m. (9)
5The constant can be computed to c = 34
√
3/2 [Jaksch et al., 2010].
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This would imply that the b-expected regret of piCRb,t would be higher than the b-expected regret than pit:∑
µ∈M
b(µ)Regt(µ, pi
CR
b,t , s0, t) ≥ b(µ′)Regt(µ′, piCRb,t , s0, t) sum of non-negative elements
≥ b(µ′)(kt−m) by (9)
>
∑
µ∈M
b(µ)Regt(µ, pit, s0, t) by (8) for sufficiently large t.
But piCRb,t minimises b-expected regret, since it maximises b-expected reward
∑
µ∈M b(µ)Gˆt(µ, pi, s0) by
definition. Thus, piCRb,t must have sublinear regret.
4.3 Implications
Theorem 19 gives an abstract condition for which decoupled RL settings enable agents to learn the true
reward function in spite of sensory corruption. For the concrete models it implies the following:
• RL. Due to the “self-observation” property of the RL observation graph Sobss′ = {s′}, the conditions can
only be satisfied when S = Ssafe or q = 0, i.e. when there is no reward corruption at all.
• CIRL. The agent can only observe the supervisor action in the current state s, so the agent essentially
only gets reward information about states s′ reachable from s in a small number of steps. Thus, the
sets Sobss′ may be smaller than 2q in many settings. While the situation is better than for RL, sensory
corruption may still mislead CIRL agents (see Example 21 below).
• LVFS. Stories may be available from a large number of states, and can describe any state. Thus, the
sets Sobss′ are realistically large, so the |Sobss′ | > 2q condition can be satisfied for all s′.
• SSRL. The supervisor’s evaluation of any state s′ may be available from safe states where the agent is
back in the lab. Thus, the Sobss′
⋂Ssafe 6= ∅ condition can be satisfied for all s′.
Thus, we find that RL and CIRL are unlikely to offer complete solutions to the sensory corruption problem,
but that both LVFS and SSRL do under reasonably realistic assumptions.
Agents drawing from multiple sources of evidence are likely to be the safest, as they will most easily
satisfy the conditions of Theorems 19 and 20. For example, humans simultaneously learn their values
from pleasure/pain stimuli (RL), watching other people act (CIRL), listening to stories (LVFS), as well as
(parental) evaluation of different scenarios (SSRL). Combining sources of evidence may also go some way
toward managing reward corruption beyond sensory corruption. For the showering robot of Example 2,
decoupled RL allows the robot to infer the reward of the showering state when in other states. For example,
the robot can ask a human in the kitchen about the true reward of showering (SSRL), or infer it from human
actions in different states (CIRL).
CIRL sensory corruption. Whether CIRL agents are vulnerable to reward corruption has generated
some discussion among AI safety researchers (based on informal discussion at conferences). Some argue that
CIRL agents are not vulnerable, as they only use the sensory data as evidence about a true signal, and have
no interest in corrupting the evidence. Others argue that CIRL agents only observe a function of the reward
function (the optimal policy or action), and are therefore equally susceptible to reward corruption as RL
agents.
Theorem 19 sheds some light on this issue, as it provides sufficient conditions for when the corrupt reward
problem can be avoided. The following example illustrates a situation where CIRL does not satisfy the
conditions, and where a CIRL agent therefore suffers significant regret due to reward corruption.
Example 21 (CIRL sensory corruption). Formally in CIRL, an agent and a human both make actions in
an MDP, with state transitions depending on the joint agent-human action (a, aH). Both the human and
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the agent is trying to optimise a reward function R˙, but the agent first needs to infer R˙ from the human’s
actions. In each transition the agent observes the human action. Analogously to how the reward may be
corrupt for RL agents, we assume that CIRL agents may systematically misperceive the human action in
certain states. Let aˆH be the observed human action, which may differ from the true human action a˙H .
In this example, there are two states s1 and s2. In each state, the agent can choose between the actions
a1, a2, and w, and the human can choose between the actions a
H
1 and a
H
2 . The agent action ai leads to state
si with certainty, i = 1, 2, regardless of the human’s action. Only if the agent chooses w does the human
action matter. Generally, aH1 is more likely to lead to s1 than a
H
2 . The exact transition probabilities are
determined by the unknown parameter p as displayed on the left:
s1 s2
1− p (w, aH1 )
p
0.5− p
(w, aH2 )
0.5 + p
(a2, ·)(a1, ·)(w, ·) (a2, ·)
(a1, ·) Hypo-
thesis
p
Best
state
s2
corrupt
H1 0.5 s1 Yes
H2 0 s2 No
The agent’s two hypotheses for p, the true reward/preferred state, and the corruptness of state s2 are
summarised to the right. In hypothesis H1, the human prefers s1, but can only reach s1 from s2 with 50%
reliability. In hypothesis H2, the human prefers s2, but can only remain in s2 with 50% probability. After
taking action w in s2, the agent always observes the human taking action aˆ
H
2 . In H1, this is explained by s2
being corrupt, and the true human action being aH1 . In H2, this is explained by the human preferring s2.
The hypotheses H1 and H2 are empirically indistinguishable, as they both predict that the transition s1 → s2
will occur with 50% probability after the observed human action aˆH2 in s2.
Assuming that the agent considers non-corruption to be likelier than corruption, the best inference the
agent can make is that the human prefers s2 to s1 (i.e. H2). The optimal policy for the agent is then to
always choose a2 to stay in s2, which means the agent suffers maximum regret. ♦
Example 21 provides an example where a CIRL agent “incorrectly” prefers a state due to sensory
corruption. The sensory corruption is analogous to reward corruption in RL, in the sense that it leads the
agent to the wrong conclusion about the true reward in the state. Thus, highly intelligent CIRL agents may
be prone to wireheading, as they may find (corrupt) states s where all evidence in s points to s having very
high reward.6 In light of Theorem 19, it is not surprising that the CIRL agent in Example 21 fails to avoid
the corrupt reward problem. Since the human is unable to affect the transition probability from s1 to s2,
no evidence about the relative reward between s1 and s2 is available from the non-corrupt state s1. Only
observations from the corrupt state s2 provide information about the reward. The observation graph for
Example 21 therefore looks like
s1 s2 , with no information being provided from s1.
5 Quantilisation: Randomness Increases Robustness
Not all contexts allow the agent to get sufficiently rich data to overcome the reward corruption problem via
Theorems 19 and 20. It is often much easier to construct RL agents than it is to construct CIRL agents,
which in turn may often be more feasible than designing LVFS or SSRL agents. Is there anything we can do
to increase robustness without providing the agent additional sources of data?
Going back to the CR agents of Section 3, the problem was that they got stuck on a particular value rˆ∗ of
the observed reward. If unlucky, rˆ∗ was available in a corrupt state, in which case the CR agent may get no
true reward. In other words, there were adversarial inputs where the CR agent performed poorly. A common
way to protect against adversarial inputs is to use a randomised algorithm. Applied to RL and CRMDPs,
6The construction required in Example 21 to create a “wireheading state” s2 for CIRL agents is substantially more involved
than for RL agents, so they may be less vulnerable to reward corruption than RL agents.
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Figure 5: Illustration of quantilisation. By randomly
picking a state with reward above some threshold δ,
adversarially placed corrupt states are likely to be
avoided.
this idea leads to quantilising agents [Taylor, 2016]. Rather than choosing the state with the highest observed
reward, these agents instead randomly choose a state from a top quantile of high-reward states.
5.1 Simple Case
To keep the idea simple, a quantilisation agent is first defined for the simple case where the agent can stay in
any state of its choosing (Assumption 14.(ii)). Theorem 23 establishes a simple regret bound for this setting.
A more general quantilisation agent is developed in Section 5.2.
Definition 22 (Quantilising Agent). For δ < 1, the δ-quantilising agent piδ random walks until all states
have been visited at least once. Then it selects a state s˜ uniformly at random from Sδ = {s : Rˆ(s) ≥ δ}, the
top quantile of high observed reward states. Then piδ goes to s˜ (by random walking or otherwise) and stays
there.
For example, a quantilising robot in Example 2 would first try to find many ways in which it could get
high observed reward, and then randomly pick one of them. If there are many more high reward states than
corrupt states (e.g. the shower is the only place with inflated rewards), then this will yield a reasonable
amount of true reward with high probability.
Theorem 23 (Quantilisation). In any CRMDP satisfying Assumption 12.(ii) and Assumption 14, the
δ-quantilising agent piδ with δ = 1−√q/|S| suffers time-averaged regret at most
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1−
(
1−
√
q/|S|
)2
. (10)
Proof. By Assumption 14.(i), piδ eventually visits all states when random walking. By Assumption 14.(ii), it
can stay in any given state s.
The observed reward Rˆ(s) in any state s ∈ Sδ is at least δ. By Assumption 12.(ii), at most q of these
states are corrupt; in the worst case, their true reward is 0 and the other |Sδ| − q states (if any) have true
reward δ. Thus, with probability at least (|Sδ| − q)/|Sδ| = 1− q/|Sδ|, the δ-quantilising agent obtains true
reward at least δ at each time step, which gives
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1− δ(1− q/|Sδ|). (11)
(If q ≥ |Sδ|, the bound (11) is vacuous.)
Under Assumption 14.(iii), for any δ ∈ [0, 1], |Sδ| ≥ (1− δ)|S|. Substituting this into (11) gives:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1− δ
(
1− q
(1− δ)|S|
)
. (12)
Equation (12) is optimised by δ = 1−√q/|S|, which gives the stated regret bound.
The time-averaged regret gets close to zero when the fraction of corrupt states q/|S| is small. For example,
if at most 0.1% of the states are corrupt, then the time-averaged regret will be at most 1−(1−√0.001)2 ≈ 0.06.
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Compared to the piRLb,t and pi
CR
b,t agents that had regret close to 1 under the same conditions (Theorem 16),
this is a significant improvement.
If rewards are stochastic, then the quantilising agent may be modified to revisit all states many times,
until a confidence interval of length 2ε and confidence 1− ε can be established for the expected reward in each
state. Letting piδt be the quantilising agent with ε = 1/t gives the same regret bound (10) with pi
δ substituted
for piδt .
Interpretation. It may seem odd that randomisation improves worst-case regret. Indeed, if the corrupt
states were chosen randomly by the environment, then randomisation would achieve nothing. To illustrate how
randomness can increase robustness, we make an analogy to Quicksort, which has average time complexity
O(n log n), but worst-case complexity O(n2). When inputs are guaranteed to be random, Quicksort is a
simple and fast sorting algorithm. However, in many situations, it is not safe to assume that inputs are
random. Therefore, a variation of Quicksort that randomises the input before it sorts them is often more
robust. Similarly, in the examples mentioned in the introduction, the corrupt states precisely coincide with
the states the agent prefers; such situations would be highly unlikely if the corrupt states were randomly
distributed. Li [1992] develops an interesting formalisation of this idea.
Another way to justify quantilisation is by Goodhart’s law, which states that most measures of success
cease to be good measures when used as targets. Applied to rewards, the law would state that cumulative
reward is only a good measure of success when the agent is not trying to optimise reward. While a literal
interpretation of this would defeat the whole purpose of RL, a softer interpretation is also possible, allowing
reward to be a good measure of success as long as the agent does not try to optimise reward too hard.
Quantilisation may be viewed as a way to build agents that are more conservative in their optimisation efforts
[Taylor, 2016].
Alternative randomisation. Not all randomness is created equal. For example, the simple randomised
soft-max and ε-greedy policies do not offer regret bounds on par with piδ, as shown by the following example.
This motivates the more careful randomisation procedure used by the quantilising agents.
Example 24 (Soft-max and ε-greedy). Consider the following simple CRMDP with n > 2 actions a1, . . . , an:
s1 s2
rˆ = r˙ = 1− ε
r˙ = 0
rˆ = 1
a2, . . . , ana1
a2, . . . , an
a1
State s1 is non-corrupt with Rˆ(s1) = R˙(s1) = 1− ε for small ε > 0, while s2 is corrupt with Rˆ(s2) = 1 and
R˙(s2) = 0. The Soft-max and ε-greedy policies will assign higher value to actions a2, . . . , an than to a1. For
large n, there are many ways of getting to s2, so a random action leads to s2 with high probability. Thus,
soft-max and ε-greedy will spend the vast majority of the time in s2, regardless of randomisation rate and
discount parameters. This gives a regret close to 1− ε, compared to an informed policy always going to s1.
Meanwhile, a δ-quantilising agent with δ ≤ 1/2 will go to s1 and s2 with equal probability, which gives a
more modest regret of (1− ε)/2. ♦
5.2 General Quantilisation Agent
This section generalises the quantilising agent to RL problems not satisfying Assumption 14. This generalisation
is important, because it is usually not possible to remain in one state and get high reward. The most naive
generalisation would be to sample between high reward policies, instead of sampling from high reward states.
However, this will typically not provide good guarantees. To see why, consider a situation where there is
a single high reward corrupt state s, and there are many ways to reach and leave s. Then a wide range of
different policies all get high reward from s. Meanwhile, all policies getting reward from other states may
receive relatively little reward. In this situation, sampling from the most high reward policies is not going to
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s1
s2
s3
s4
rˆ = 0
rˆ = 1
rˆ = 0
rˆ = 1
Sδi
Figure 6: Illustration of rˆ-contribution and value support. As-
sume the policy pii randomly traverses a loop s1, s2, s3, s4 indefi-
nitely, with dpii(sj) = 1/4 for j = 1, . . . , 4. The rˆ-contribution
vcpii is 0 in s1 and s3, and vc
pii is 1/4 · 1 = 1/4 in s2 and s4. The
set Sδi = {s2, s4} is a δ-value supporting pii for δ = 1/2, since
vcpii(s2) = vc
pii(s4) ≥ (1/2)/2 = 1/4.
increase robustness, since the sampling will just be between different ways of getting reward from the same
corrupt state s.
For this reason, we must ensure that different “sampleable” policies get reward from different states. As a
first step, we make a couple of definitions to say which states provide reward to which policies. The concepts
of Definition 26 are illustrated in Figure 6.
Definition 25 (Unichain CRMDP [Puterman, 1994, p. 348]). A CRMDP µ is unichain if any stationary
policy pi : S → ∆A induces a stationary distribution dpi on S that is independent of the initial state s0.
Definition 26 (Value support). In a unichain CRMDP, let the asymptotic value contribution of s to pi be
vcpi(s) = dpi(s)Rˆ(s). We say that a set Sδi is δ-value supporting a policy pii if
∀s ∈ Sδi : vcpii(s) ≥ δ/|Sδi |.
We are now ready to define a general δ-Quantilising agent. The definition is for theoretical purposes only.
It is unsuitable for practical implementation both because of the extreme data and memory requirements of
Step 1, and because of the computational complexity of Step 2. Finding a practical approximation is left for
future research.
Definition 27 (General δ-Quantilising Agent). In a unichain CRMDP, the generalised δ-quantilising agent
piδ performs the following steps. The input is a CRMDP µ and a parameter δ ∈ [0, 1].
1. Estimate the value of all stationary policies, including their value support.
2. Choose a collection of disjoint sets Sδi , each δ-value supporting a stationary policy pii. If multiple choices
are possible, choose one maximising the cardinality of the union Sδ = ⋃i Sδi . If no such collection exists,
return: “Failed because δ too high”.
3. Randomly sample a state s from Sδ = ⋃i Sδi .
4. Follow the policy pii associated with the set Sδi containing s.
The general quantilising agent of Definition 27 is a generalisation of the simple quantilising agent of
Definition 22. In the special case where Assumption 14 holds, the general agent reduces to the simpler one by
using singleton sets Sδi = {si} for high reward states si, and by letting pii be the policy that always stays
in si. In situations where it is not possible to keep receiving high reward by remaining in one state, the
generalised Definition 27 allows policies to solicit rewards from a range of states. The intuitive reason for
choosing the policy pii with probability proportional to the value support in Steps 3–4 is that policies with
larger value support are better at avoiding corrupt states. For example, a policy only visiting one state may
have been unlucky and picked a corrupt state. In contrast, a policy obtaining reward from many states must
be “very unlucky” if all the reward states it visits are corrupt.
Theorem 28 (General quantilisation agent regret bound). In any unichain CRMDP µ, a general δ-
quantilising agent piδ suffers time-averaged regret at most
lim
t→∞
1
t
Reg(M, piδ, s0, t) ≤ 1− δ(1− q/|Sδ|) (13)
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provided a non-empty collection {Sδi } of δ-value supporting sets exists.
Proof. We will use the notation from Definition 27.
Step 1 is well-defined since the CRMDP is unichain, which means that for all stationary policies pi the
stationary distribution dpi and the value support vc
pi are well-defined and may be estimated simply by
following the policy pi. There is a (large) finite number of stationary policies, so in principle their stationary
distributions and value support can be estimated.
To bound the regret, consider first the average reward of a policy pii with value support Sδi . The policy pii
must obtain asymptotic average observed reward at least:
lim
t→∞
1
t
Gˆt(µ, pii, s0) =
∑
s∈S
dpi(s)Rˆ(s) by definition of dpi and Gˆt
≥
∑
s∈Sδi
dpi(s)Rˆ(s) sum of positive terms
≥
∑
s∈Sδi
δ/|Sδi | Sδi is δ-value support for pii
= |Sδi | · δ/|Sδi | = δ
If there are qi corrupt states in Sδi with true reward 0, then the average true reward must be
lim
t→∞
1
t
G˙t(µ, pii, s0) ≥ (|Sδi | − qi) · δ/|Sδi | = (1− qi/|Sδi |) · δ (14)
since the true reward must correspond to the observed reward in all the (|Sδi | − qi) non-corrupt states.
For any distribution of corrupt states, the quantilising agent that selects pii with probability P (pii) =
|Sδi |/|Sδ| will obtain
lim
t→∞
1
t
Gt(µ, pi
δ, s0) = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
i
P (pii)Gt(µ, pii, s0)
≥
∑
i
P (pii)(1− qi/|Sδi |) · δ by equation (14)
= δ
∑
i
|Sδi |
|Sδ| (1− qi/|S
δ
i |) by construction of P (pii)
=
δ
|Sδ|
∑
i
(|Sδi | − qi) elementary algebra
=
δ
|Sδ| (|S
δ| − q) = δ(1− q/|Sδ|) by summing |Sδi | and qi
The informed policy gets true reward at most 1 at each time step, which gives the claimed bound (13).
When Assumption 14 is satisfied, the bound is the same as for the simple quantilising agent in Section 5.1
for δ = 1−√q/|S|. In other cases, the bound may be much weaker. For example, in many environments it
is not possible to obtain reward by remaining in one state. The agent may have to spend significant time
“travelling” between high reward states. So typically only a small fraction of the time will be spent in high
reward states, which in turn makes the stationary distribution dpi is small. This puts a strong upper bound
on the value contribution vcpi, which means that the value supporting sets Sδi will be empty unless δ is close
to 0. While this makes the bound of Theorem 28 weak, it nonetheless bounds the regret away from 1 even
under weak assumptions, which is a significant improvement on the RL and CR agents in Theorem 16.
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(a) 1 goal tile (b) 2 goal tiles (c) 4 goal tiles
Figure 7: Starting positions: the blue square indicates corrupt reward, and the yellow circles indicate true
rewards.
Examples. To make the discussion a bit more concrete, let us also speculate about the performance of a
quantilising agent in some of the examples in the introduction:
• In the boat racing example (Example 1), the circling strategy only got about 20% higher score than
a winning strategy [Amodei and Clark, 2016]. Therefore, a quantilising agent would likely only need
to sacrifice about 20% observed reward in order to be able to randomly select from a large range of
winning policies.
• In the wireheading example (Example 3), it is plausible that the agent gets significantly more reward
in wireheaded states compared to “normal” states. Wireheading policies may also be comparatively
rare, as wireheading may require very deliberate sequences of actions to override sensors. Under this
assumption, a quantilising agent may be less likely to wirehead. While it may need to sacrifice a large
amount of observed reward compared to an RL agent, its true reward may often be greater.
Summary. In summary, quantilisation offers a way to increase robustness via randomisation, using only
reward feedback. Unsurprisingly, the strength of the regret bounds heavily depends on the assumptions we
are willing to make, such as the prevalence of high reward states. Further research may investigate efficient
approximations and empirical performance of quantilising agents, as well as dynamic adjustments of the
threshold δ. Combinations with imperfect decoupled RL solutions (such as CIRL), as well as extensions to
infinite state spaces could also offer fruitful directions for further theoretical investigation. Taylor [2016]
discusses some general open problems related to quantilisation.
6 Experimental Results
In this section the theoretical results are illustrated with some simple experiments. The setup is a gridworld
containing some true reward tiles (indicated by yellow circles) and some corrupt reward tiles (indicated by
blue squares). We use a setup with 1, 2 or 4 goal tiles with true reward 0.9 each, and one corrupt reward tile
with observed reward 1 and true reward 0 (Figure 7 shows the starting positions). Empty tiles have reward
0.1, and walking into a wall gives reward 0. The state is represented by the (x, y) coordinates of the agent.
The agent can move up, down, left, right, or stay put. The discounting factor is γ = 0.9. This is a continuing
task, so the environment does not reset when the agent visits the corrupt or goal tiles. The experiments
were implemented in the AIXIjs framework for reinforcement learning [Aslanides et al., 2017] and the code is
available online in the AIXIjs repository (http://aslanides.io/aixijs/demo.html?reward_corruption).
We demonstrate that RL agents like Q-learning and softmax Q-learning cannot overcome corrupt reward
(as discussed in Section 3), while quantilisation helps overcome corrupt reward (as discussed in Section 5).
We run Q-learning with -greedy ( = 0.1), softmax with temperature β = 2, and the quantilising agent with
δ = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 (where 0.8 = 1−√q/|S| = 1−√1/25) for 100 runs with 1 million cycles. Average observed
and true rewards after 1 million cycles are shown in Table 1, and reward trajectories are shown in Figure 8.
Q-learning gets stuck on the corrupt tile and spend almost all the time there (getting observed reward around
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(c) Observed rewards for 2 goal tiles
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(d) True rewards for 2 goal tiles
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(e) Observed rewards for 4 goal tiles
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Figure 8: Trajectories of average observed and true rewards for Q-learning, softmax and quantilising agents,
showing mean ± standard deviation over 100 runs. Q-learning and quantilising agents converge to a similar
observed reward, but very different true rewards (much higher for the quantiliser with high variance). The
value of δ that gives the highest true reward varies for different numbers of goal tiles.
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goal tiles agent average observed reward average true reward
1
Q-learning 0.923± 0.0003 0.00852± 0.00004
Softmax Q-learning 0.671± 0.0005 0.0347± 0.00006
Quantilising (δ = 0.2) 0.838± 0.15 0.378± 0.35
Quantilising (δ = 0.5) 0.943± 0.12 0.133± 0.27
Quantilising (δ = 0.8) 0.979± 0.076 0.049± 0.18
2
Q-learning 0.921± 0.00062 0.0309± 0.0051
Softmax Q-learning 0.671± 0.0004 0.0738± 0.0005
Quantilising (δ = 0.2) 0.934± 0.047 0.594± 0.43
Quantilising (δ = 0.5) 0.931± 0.046 0.621± 0.42
Quantilising (δ = 0.8) 0.944± 0.05 0.504± 0.45
4
Q-learning 0.924± 0.0002 0.00919± 0.00014
Softmax Q-learning 0.657± 0.0004 0.111± 0.0006
Quantilising (δ = 0.2) 0.918± 0.038 0.738± 0.35
Quantilising (δ = 0.5) 0.926± 0.044 0.666± 0.39
Quantilising (δ = 0.8) 0.915± 0.036 0.765± 0.32
Table 1: Average true and observed rewards after 1 million cycles, showing mean ± standard deviation over
100 runs. Q-learning achieves high observed reward but low true reward, and softmax achieves medium
observed reward and a slightly higher true reward than Q-learning. The quantilising agent achieves similar
observed reward to Q-learning, but much higher true reward (with much more variance). Having more than 1
goal tile leads to a large improvement in true reward for the quantiliser, a small improvement for softmax,
and no improvement for Q-learning.
1 · (1− ) = 0.9), softmax spends most of its time on the corrupt tile, while the quantilising agent often stays
on one of the goal tiles.
7 Conclusions
This paper has studied the consequences of corrupt reward functions. Reward functions may be corrupt due
to bugs or misspecifications, sensory errors, or because the agent finds a way to inappropriately modify the
reward mechanism. Some examples were given in the introduction. As agents become more competent at
optimising their reward functions, they will likely also become more competent at (ab)using reward corruption
to gain higher reward. Reward corruption may impede the performance of a wide range of agents, and may
have disastrous consequences for highly intelligent agents [Bostrom, 2014].
To formalise the corrupt reward problem, we extended a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with a possibly
corrupt reward function, and defined a formal performance measure (regret). This enabled the derivation of
a number of formally precise results for how seriously different agents were affected by reward corruption
in different setups (Table 2). The results are all intuitively plausible, which provides some support for the
choice of formal model.
The main takeaways from the results are:
• Without simplifying assumptions, no agent can avoid the corrupt reward problem (Theorem 11). This is
effectively a No Free Lunch result, showing that unless some assumption is made about the reward
corruption, no agent can outperform a random agent. Some natural simplifying assumptions to avoid
the No Free Lunch result were suggested in Section 2.
• Using the reward signal as evidence rather than optimisation target is no magic bullet, even under
strong simplifying assumptions (Theorem 16). Essentially, this is because the agent does not know the
exact relation between the observed reward (the “evidence”) and the true reward.7 However, when
7In situations where the exact relation is known, then a non-corrupt reward function can be defined. Our results are not
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Assumption No assumptions
Assumption 12 or 12′, and . . .
no other assumptions Assumption 14 CIRL SSRL/LVFS
Result all agents fail piδ weak bound
piRLb,t , pi
CR
b,t fail
piδ succeeds
piCRb,t fails pi
CR
b,t succeeds
Table 2: Main takeaways. Without additional assumptions, all agents fail (i.e., suffer high regret). Restricting
the reward corruption with Assumption 12 gives a weak bound for the quantilising agent. The piRLb,t and pi
CR
b,t
agents still fail even if we additionally assume many high reward states and agent control (Assumption 14),
but the quantilising agent piδ does well. In most realistic contexts, the true reward is learnable in spite of
sensory corruption in SSRL and LVFS, but not in CIRL.
the data enables sufficient crosschecking of rewards, agents can avoid the corrupt reward problem
(Theorems 19 and 20). For example, in SSRL and LVFS this type of crosschecking is possible under
natural assumptions. In RL, no crosschecking is possible, while CIRL is a borderline case. Combining
frameworks and providing the agent with different sources of data may often be the safest option.
• In cases where sufficient crosschecking of rewards is not possible, quantilisation may improve robustness
(Theorems 23 and 28). Essentially, quantilisation prevents agents from overoptimising their objectives.
How well quantilisation works depends on how the number of corrupt solutions compares to the number
of good solutions.
The results indicate that while reward corruption constitutes a major problem for traditional RL algorithms,
there are promising ways around it, both within the RL framework, and in alternative frameworks such as
CIRL, SSRL and LVFS.
Future work. Finally, some interesting open questions are listed below:
• (Unobserved state) In both the RL and the decoupled RL models, the agent gets an accurate signal
about which state it is in. What if the state is hidden? What if the signal informing the agent about
its current state can be corrupt?
• (Non-stationary corruption function) In this work, we tacitly assumed that both the reward and the
corruption functions are stationary, and are always the same in the same state. What if the corruption
function is non-stationary, and influenceable by the agent’s actions? (such as if the agent builds a
delusion box around itself [Ring and Orseau, 2011])
• (Infinite state space) Many of the results and arguments relied on there being a finite number of states.
This makes learning easy, as the agent can visit every state. It also makes quantilisation easy, as there is
a finite set of states/strategies to randomly sample from. What if there is an infinite number of states,
and the agent has to generalise insights between states? What are the conditions on the observation
graph for Theorems 19 and 20? What is a good generalisation of the quantilising agent?
• (Concrete CIRL condition) In Example 21, we only heuristically inferred the observation graph from
the CIRL problem description. Is there a general way of doing this? Or is there a direct formulation of
the no-corruption condition in CIRL, analogous to Theorems 19 and 20?
• (Practical quantilising agent) As formulated in Definition 22, the quantilising agent piδ is extremely
inefficient with respect to data, memory, and computation. Meanwhile, many practical RL algorithms
use randomness in various ways (e.g. ε-greedy [Sutton and Barto, 1998]). Is there a way to make an
efficient quantilisation agent that retains the robustness guarantees?
relevant for this case.
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• (Dynamically adapting quantilising agent) In Definition 27, the threshold δ is given as a parameter.
Under what circumstances can we define a “parameter free” quantilising agent that adapts δ as it
interacts with the environment?
• (Decoupled RL quantilisation result) What if we use quantilisation in decoupled RL settings that nearly
meet the conditions of Theorems 19 and 20? Can we prove a stronger bound?
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